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With the rapid development of connected vehicles, the cybersecurity has become an important topic in the automotive network. A spoof ECU can be used to hack the automotive network.

In recent years, with increase in external connectivity (V2X, telematics, mobile projection, BYOD) the automobile is becoming a target of cyberattacks and intrusions. Any such intrusion reduces customer trust in connected cars and negatively impacts brand image (like the recent Jeep Cherokee hack). To protect against intrusion, several mechanisms are available. These range from a simple secure CAN to a specialized symbiote defense software. A few systems (e.g. V2X) implement detection of an intrusion (defined as a misbehaving entity). However, most of the mechanisms require a system-wide change which adds to the cost and negatively impacts the performance. In this paper, we are proposing a practical and scalable approach to intrusion detection. Some benefits of our approach include use of existing security mechanisms such as TrustZone® and watermarking with little or no impact on cost and performance. In addition, our approach is scalable and does not require any system-wide changes.

Autonomous driving represents the ultimate goal of future automobile development. As a collaborative application that integrates vehicles, road infrastructure, network and cloud, autonomous driving business requires a high-degree dynamic cooperation among multiple resources such as data, computing and communications that are distributed throughout the system. In order to meet the anticipated high demand for resources and performance requirements of autonomous driving, and to ensure the safety and comfort of the vehicle users and pedestrians, a top concern of autonomous driving is to understand the system requirements for resources and conduct an in-depth analysis of the autonomous driving business. In this context, this paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the typical business for autonomous driving and establishes an analysis model for five common capabilities, i.e. collection, transmission, intelligent computing, human-machine interaction (HMI), and security.

Controller area network (CAN) is used as a legacy protocol for in-vehicle communication. However, it lacks basic security features such as message authentication, integrity, confidentiality, etc., because the sender information in the message is missing. Hence, it is prone to different attacks like spoofing attacks, denial of service attacks, man in the middle and masquerade attacks. Researchers have proposed various techniques to detect and prevent these attacks, which can be split into two classes: (a) MAC-based techniques and (b) intrusion detection-based techniques. Further, intrusion detection systems can be divided into four categories: (i) message parameter- based, (ii) entropy-based, (iii) machine Learning-based and (iv) fingerprinting-based. This paper details state-of- the-art survey of fingerprinting-based intrusion detection techniques. In addition, the advantages and limitations of different fingerprinting-based intrusion detection techniques methods will be discussed.

It is deemed that currently the intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) is in its early stage of development, and it will go through multiple development stages in the future to realize its final goal—autonomous driving. Based on the existing ICV researches, this paper believes that ICV can be used to improve the efficiency and safety of freeway. The current research of ICV has two main directions: one focuses on the traffic flow characteristics of vehicles with different attributes, the other is concerned with using ICV to reduce congestion. From the policies issued by countries around the world and the development plans promoted by major vehicle manufacturers, the future development trends and challenges of ICV are analyzed. ICV must overcome all the shortcomings to achieve its final goal, including insufficient hardware capabilities or excessive cost, and the degree of intelligence that needs to be improved.

Advanced Autonomous Vehicles (AV) for SAE Level 3 and Level 4 functions will lead to a new understanding of the operation phase in the overall product lifecycle. Regulations such as the EU Implementing Act and the German L4 Act (AFGBV) request a continuous field surveillance, the handling of critical E/E faults and software updates during operation. This is required to enhance the Operational Design Domain (ODD) during operation, offering Functions on Demand (FoD), by increasing software features within these autonomous vehicle systems over the entire digital product lifecycle, and to avoid and reduce downtime by a malfunction of the Autonomous Driving (AD) software stack.

Cyber assurance of heavy trucks is a major concern with new designs as well as with supporting legacy systems. Many cyber security experts and analysts are used to working with traditional information technology (IT) networks and are familiar with a set of technologies that may not be directly useful in the commercial vehicle sector. To help connect security researchers to heavy trucks, a remotely accessible testbed has been prototyped for experimentation with security methodologies and techniques to evaluate and improve on existing technologies, as well as developing domain-specific technologies. The testbed relies on embedded Linux-based node controllers that can simulate the sensor inputs to various heavy vehicle electronic control units (ECUs). The node controller also monitors and affects the flow of network information between the ECUs and the vehicle communications backbone.

While current cybersecurity endeavors in the heavy-duty (HD) vehicle space focus on securing conventional communication technologies such as the controller area network (CAN), there is a notable deficiency in defensive research concerning legacy technologies, particularly those utilized between trucks and trailers. ...To the best of current knowledge, this publication marks the first presentation of cybersecurity defense research on the SAE J1708/J1587 protocol stack.

Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) may encounter difficulties accommodating environmental uncertainties and system degradations during harsh conditions. However, human experience and onboard intelligence can may help mitigate such cases. Unfortunately, human operators have cognition limits when directly supervising multiple UGVs. Ideally, an automated decision aid can be designed that empowers the human operator to supervise the UGVs. In this paper, we consider a connected UGV platoon under cyber attacks that may disrupt safety and degrade performance. An observer-based resilient control strategy is designed to mitigate the effects of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) cyber attacks. In addition, each UGV generates both internal and external evaluations based on the platoons performance metrics. A cloud-based trust-based information management system collects these evaluations to detect abnormal UGV platoon behaviors.

Upon their arrival, Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) brought with them many benefits for those involved in a military campaign. They can use such systems to reconnoiter dangerous areas, provide 24-hr aerial security surveillance for force protection purposes or even attack enemy targets all the while avoiding friendly human losses in the process. Unfortunately, these platforms also carry the inherent risk of being built on innately vulnerable cybernetic systems. From software which can be tampered with to either steal data, damage or even outright steal the aircraft, to the data networks used for communications which can be jammed or even eavesdropped on to gain access to sensible information. All this has the potential to turn the benefits of UAS into liabilities and although the last decade has seen great advances in the development of protection and countermeasures against the described threats and beyond the risk still endures.

Unsettled Issues Regarding Autonomous Vehicles and Open-source Software introduces the impact of software in advanced automotive applications, the role of open-source communities in accelerating innovation, and the important topic of safety and cybersecurity. As electronic functionality is captured in software and a bigger percentage of that software is open-source code, some critical challenges arise concerning security and validation.

On-road vehicles equipped with driving automation features—where a human might not be needed for operation on-board—are entering the mainstream public space. However, questions like “How safe is safe enough?” and “What to do if the system fails?” persist. This is where remote operation comes in, which is an additional layer to the automated driving system where a human remotely assists the so-called “driverless” vehicle in certain situations. Such remote-operation solutions introduce additional challenges and potential risks as the entire vehicle-network-human now needs to work together safely, effectively, and practically. Unsettled Issues in Remote Operation for On-road Driving Automation highlights technical questions (e.g., network latency, bandwidth, cyber security) and human aspects (e.g., workload, attentiveness, situational awareness) of remote operation and introduces evolving solutions.

Modern automobiles collect around 25 gigabytes of data per hour and autonomous vehicles are expected to generate more than 100 times that number. In comparison, the Apollo Guidance Computer assisting in the moon launches had only a 32-kilobtye hard disk. Without question, the breadth of in-vehicle data has opened new possibilities and challenges. The potential for accessing this data has led many entrepreneurs to claim that data is more valuable than even the vehicle itself. These intrepid data-miners seek to explore business opportunities in predictive maintenance, pay-as-you-drive features, and infrastructure services. Yet, the use of data comes with inherent challenges: accessibility, ownership, security, and privacy. Unsettled Legal Issues Facing Data in Autonomous, Connected, Electric, and Shared Vehicles examines some of the pressing questions on the minds of both industry and consumers. Who owns the data and how can it be used?

Its extensive application of data networks, including enhanced external digital communication, forced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), for the first time, to set “Special Conditions” for cybersecurity. In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. ...In the 15 years that ensued, airworthiness regulation followed suit, and all key rule-, regulation-, and standard-making organizations weighed in to establish a new airworthiness cybersecurity superset of legislation, regulation, and standardization. The resulting International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolutions, US and European Union (EU) legislations, FAA and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, and the DO-326/ED-202 set of standards are already the de-facto, and soon becoming the official, standards for legislation, regulation, and best practices, with the FAA already mandating it to a constantly growing extent for a few years now—and EASA adopting the set in its entirety in July 2020.

What standardization is needed to ensure that quantum technologies do not pose an unacceptable risk from an automotive cybersecurity perspective? Click here to access the full SAE EDGETM Research Report portfolio.

Day by day, airports adopt more IoT devices. However, airports are not exempt from possible failures due to malware’s proliferation that can abuse vulnerabilities. Computer criminals can access, corrupt, and extract information from individuals or companies. This paper explains the development of a propagation model, which started with a Delphi process. We discuss the preliminary implications for airports of the simulation model built from the Delphi recommendations.

Using a wireless medium for tractor-trailer communication will bring new cybersecurity challenges and requirements which requires new development and lifecycle considerations.

This exercise confirms the necessity of a more restrictive cybersecurity posture in automotive peripherals with access to critical systems, in particular VDAs, and especially when such peripherals present a wireless interface.

This paper gives a definition of the SDV concept, provides views from different aspects, discusses the progress in vehicle E/E architecture, especially zone-based architecture with centralized computation, and various technologies including High-Performance Computing (HPC) platform, standardized vehicle software architecture, advanced onboard communication, Over-The-Air (OTA) update, and cybersecurity etc. that collectively enable the realization of SDV.

It is essential to note that cybersecurity threats not only arise from inherent protocol defects but also consider software implementation vulnerabilities.